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Abstract
We study the optimal design of clearing systems. We analyze how counterparty
risk should be allocated, whether traders should be fully insured against that risk,
and how moral hazard a¤ects the optimal allocation of risk. The main advantage of
centralized clearing, as opposed to no or decentralized clearing, is the mutualization of
risk. While mutualization fully insures idiosyncratic risk, it cannot provide insurance
against aggregate risk. When the latter is signicant, it is e¢ cient that protection buy-
ers exert e¤ort to nd robust counterparties, whose low default risk makes it possible
for the clearing system to withstand aggregate shocks. When this e¤ort is unobserv-
able, incentive compatibility requires that protection buyers retain some exposure to
counterparty risk even with centralized clearing.
JEL classification: G22, G28, D82
Keywords: Risk-sharing; Moral hazard; Optimal contracting; Counterparty risk;
Central Clearing Counterparty; Mutualization; Aggregate and idiosyncratic risk
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Non-Technical Summary 
Would the development of Centralised Clearing Platforms (hereafter CCPs) improve 
the working of markets? In September 2009, the G20 leaders, followed by the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, and then the European 
Commission, answered yes. They proposed that all standardised OTC derivatives 
contracts be centrally cleared. 
How, and to what extent, can clearing improve the allocation of risk and how 
should it be designed? Should it be decentralized or centralised? Should it provide full 
insurance against counterparty default? Is it likely to decrease or increase risk-taking? 
Is clearing enough to cope with counterparty risk, or should it be complemented by 
other risk-mitigation tools? We take an optimal contracting approach to analyse these 
issues and offer policy implications. 
We analyse an environment in which protection buyers hold risky assets, 
which are exposed to both aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risk. To hedge that risk, 
protection buyers contract with limited-liability protection sellers. Protection sellers 
are able to provide insurance against protection buyers’ risk but they can default on 
their contractual obligations with positive probability, thus generating counterparty 
risk for protection buyers.  
In line with the classic theory of insurance, our analysis identifies three ways 
in which counterparty risk can be mitigated. First, resources can be deposited in safe 
assets and used to make promised payments in case of counterparty default. This is 
comparable to self-insurance, whereby an agent saves to insure against future negative 
shocks. However, safe deposits entail opportunity costs of foregoing more productive 
investments. Second, agents can search for counterparties with low default risk. This 
is comparable to self-protection, whereby an agent exerts effort to reduce default 
probabilities. Such search effort is costly as it entails time and resources spent on, 
e.g., due diligence. Third, trading parties can mutualize their risk. 
We show that the main advantage of centralised clearing is the mutualisation 
of idiosyncratic risk. Mutualisation allows economising on the opportunity costs of 
safe deposits, as well as on the costs of finding creditworthy counterparties. Hence, 
whenever the protection buyers’ risk has an idiosyncratic component, centralised 
clearing improves on no or decentralized clearing in our model.  
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While mutualisation can insure against idiosyncratic components of buyers’ 
risk, it cannot provide insurance against aggregate risk. When the latter is significant, 
it is efficient that protection buyers exert effort to find robust counterparties, whose 
low default risk makes it possible for the clearing system to withstand aggregate 
shocks. We show that when this effort is privately observable, leading to moral hazard 
concerns, incentive compatibility requires that protection buyers retain some exposure 
to counterparty risk, even with centralised clearing. Hence, under moral hazard and 
aggregate risk, the CCP should be designed to maintain proper incentives of members 
to search for solid counterparties.  
We discuss a number of policy issues. Regarding the question of whether 
participation in the CCP should be mandatory, we argue that if all clearing is initially 
decentralised, it may be difficult to change expectations and coordinate on the Pareto 
dominant equilibrium with centralised clearing. In that case, making centralised 
clearing mandatory is Pareto improving. Regarding the governance and regulation of 
CCPs, we show that in our set-up, a CCP which is mutually owned by its users 
implements the optimal clearing mechanism. By contrast, a for-profit shareholder-
owned CCP may not achieve the same level of efficiency and may thus have to be 
regulated. 
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1 Introduction
Counterparty risk is the risk to each party of a contract that his or her counterparty will
not live up to its contractual obligations. As vividly illustrated by the failure of Lehman
Brothers and the near failures of AIG and Bear Stearns, counterparty risk is a real issue
for investors. These episodes underscore that institutions should monitor the risk of their
counterparties and strive to contract with creditworthy ones.
Clearing entities, and in particular Centralized Clearing Platforms (hereafter CCPs), can
o¤er insurance against counterparty risk. The clearing entity interposes between the two
parties. If one of them is unable to meet its obligations to the other, the clearing entity
makes the payment on behalf of the defaulting party. Would the use of CCPs make markets
safer? In September 2009, the G20 leaders, followed by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
& Consumer Protection Act, and then the European Commission, answered yes. They
proposed that all standardized OTC derivatives contracts be centrally cleared.1
Was this the right move? More generally, how, and to what extent, can clearing improve
the allocation of risk, and how should it be designed? Should it be decentralized or central-
ized? Should it provide full insurance against counterparty default? Is it likely to decrease
or increase risk exposures? Is clearing enough to cope with counterparty risk, or should it
be complemented by other risk-mitigation tools? We take an optimal contracting approach
to analyze these issues and o¤er policy implications.
We consider a simple model in which a continuum of risk-averse agents who hold risky
assets (protection buyers) faces a continuum of risk-neutral limited-liability agents (protec-
tion sellers). For example, protection buyers can be nancial institutions holding a portfolio
of loans and seeking insurance against the default of these loans. For simplicity we assume
that the asset held by each protection buyer can take on only two values, high and low, with
equal probability. The protection sellers o¤er to insure the protection buyers against the risk
of a low value of this asset.2 The problem is that protection sellers themselves may default.
This creates counterparty risk for protection buyers and reduces the extent to which they
can hedge their own risk. At some cost, protection buyers can exert e¤ort to search for good
1The G20 meeting in September 2009 chose December 2012 as the deadline for this change. It is not clear
this deadline will be met.
2To achieve this, the two parties can trade a Credit Default Swap, or possibly another derivative, such
as a forward contract. Our optimal contracting approach enables us to consider general contract structures,
without restricting attention to particular instruments.
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counterparties with low default risk (due diligence). When deciding whether to do so,
protection buyers trade o¤ the benets of better insurance (granted by good counterparties)
and the cost of e¤ort. If protection buyers are su¢ ciently risk-averse, or the search cost is
low enough, then it is optimal to exert e¤ort to nd a creditworthy counterparty.
Even when they exert e¤ort, protection buyers remain exposed to some counterparty
risk since the default probability of the protection seller is always strictly positive. In this
context, how can a clearing entity o¤er insurance against counterparty risk and improve
welfare? To clarify the economic drivers underlying this issue, we distinguish three cases.
First, the risk exposures of the protection buyers are independent, and their search e¤ort is
observable and contractible (no moral hazard). Second, the risk exposure of the protection
buyers has an aggregate component, but there is no moral hazard. Third, the risk exposure
has an aggregate component and there is moral hazard. The optimal design as well as the
usefulness of clearing arrangements vary across these three cases.
Consider the rst case (no aggregate risk, no moral hazard). With decentralized clearing,
there are clearing agents interposing between each pair of protection buyer and protection
seller. For a fee, these clearing agents can insure protection buyers against the default of
their counterparty. A clearing agent chooses a portfolio of liquid, low-return assets (cash)
and illiquid, high-return assets. To be able to pay protection buyers, clearing agents must
set aside liquid assets. This has an opportunity cost since the return on liquid assets is
lower than on illiquid ones. Because of this cost, it is optimal to insure only partially against
counterparty risk. Since they are not fully insured against counterparty risk, it is optimal for
su¢ ciently risk-averse protection buyers to exert e¤ort and search for creditworthy protection
sellers.
With centralized clearing, the CCP interposes between all protection buyers and all
protection sellers. Hence, the total insurance payment by the CCP is the sum of all the
individual payments to protection buyers. Since the individual risks are independent, the
law of large numbers applies and the sum of all payments is deterministic. Correspondingly,
the fees levied by the CCP are exactly equal to the amount of insurance needed and it is
no longer necessary to set aside liquid assets. Thus, the rst benet of mutualization via
a CCP is that it avoids the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets. Since this cost is
not incurred, full insurance against counterparty risk is optimal. This is the second benet
of mutualization. Also, with mutualization, the protection buyers e¤ectively insure each
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other. Hence, they are not a¤ected by the default of protection sellers. Consequently there
is no need to search for good counterparties. Avoiding the search cost is the third benet of
mutualization.
Consider now the second case (aggregate risk, no moral hazard).3 To model aggregate
risk, we assume there are two equiprobable macro-states, referred to as good and bad. In
the good state, the probability that each individual protection buyers asset value is high
is greater than one half. In the bad state, it is lower than one half.4 Conditional on the
realization of the macro-state, the values of the protection buyersassets are i.i.d. Hence,
the aggregate value of the protection buyersassets is larger in the good state than in the
bad state. While mutualization among protection buyers continues to be useful, it cannot
provide insurance against the aggregate risk. The protection sellers become valuable again,
even with centralized clearing, because the resources they bring to the table are useful to
insure protection buyers against aggregate risk. Correspondingly, the e¤ort to search for good
counterparties is also valuable. If protection buyers are su¢ ciently risk-averse, the optimal
contract involves i) e¤ort to locate good counterparties, and ii) full insurance thanks to the
mutualization of idiosyncratic risk and transfers from protection sellers in the bad macro-
state.
Finally, consider the third and most intricate case (aggregate risk and moral hazard).
In this case, the CCP cannot observe whether protection buyers exert search e¤ort to nd
creditworthy protection sellers or not. Should the CCP continue to promise full insurance
against counterparty risk as in the second case above? If it does, then protection buyers have
no incentive to incur the cost associated with the search for creditworthy counterparties.
Consequently, the average amount of resources brought to the table by protection sellers
would be small. Their default rate would be high in the bad macro-state and the CCP
would have to pay a lot of insurance. This liability could exceed the resources of the CCP,
and push it into bankruptcy. To avoid this, the CCP should not o¤er full insurance against
counterparty risk when there is moral hazard. This risk exposure, while suboptimal in the
rst-best, is needed in the second-best to maintain the incentives of protection buyers to
3In the rst case, we analyzed why centralized clearing dominated decentralized clearing. For brevity,
in the second and third cases we only consider centralized clearing. This is without loss of generality. In
our optimal contracting framework, the optimal centralized mechanism dominates decentralized clearing by
construction.
4Exante, the probability that the value of the asset is good is exactly one half on average. The model
with aggregate risk nests the model without aggregate risk as a particular case.
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exert search e¤ort.
In sum, our analysis yields the following implications. Centralized clearing is superior to
decentralized clearing, since it enables the mutualization of risk. Policy makers are therefore
right to promote centralized clearing. They should, however, keep in mind the limitations of
centralized clearing and endeavor to mitigate their adverse consquences. In particular, while
the mutualization delivered by centralized clearing reduces the exposure to idiosyncratic risk,
it does not reduce the exposure to aggregate risk. Minimizing that exposure requires exerting
e¤ort to nd creditworthy counterparties, robust to macro-shocks, and also attracting diverse
counterparties, whose default risks are not too correlated. Our analysis also underscores that
centralizing clearing can reduce both the social value and the private incentives to exert the
search e¤ort. While improving the allocation of counterparty risk, the centralization of
clearing might therefore increase the aggregate counterparty default rate. Finally, under
the plausible assumption that the e¤ort to nd creditworthy counterparties is unobservable,
there is a moral hazard problem and the CCP must be designed to maintain the incentives of
protection buyers. This precludes full insurance against counterparty default. The incentive
constraint is especially important when aggregate risk is signicant. In particular, when
aggregate risk is large, incentive compatibility requires that protection buyers retain some
exposure to the idiosyncratic component of risk.
Our analysis contributes to the micro-prudential and the macro-prudential study of clear-
ing mechanisms. Micro-prudential analyses focus on one nancial institution, studying its
regulation, e.g., to avoid excessive risk-taking. Macro-prudential analyses consider a popula-
tion of nancial institutions and focus on the equilibrium interactions between these institu-
tions, as well as on aggregate outcomes generated by these interactions. All of these features
are present in our analysis. This is because, by construction, CCPs raise macro-prudential
issues since they clear the trades of a population of nancial institutions. Furthermore, our
analysis emphasizes the interaction between the design of CCPs and the presence of aggre-
gate risk. It underscores that when aggregate risk is signicant, CCPs are useful but should
not provide full insurance against counterparty risk, lest this would jeopardize the incentives
of market participants to search for creditworthy counterparties.
The next section presents the institutional background. Section 3 reviews the literature.
Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 analyzes the case with no aggregate risk and no
moral hazard. Section 6 turns to the case with aggregate risk and no moral hazard. Section
7
7 examines the situation in which there is both aggregate risk and moral hazard. Section
8 o¤ers a discussion. Section 9 concludes. Proofs not given in the text are in the online
appendix.
2 Institutional background
Denition of clearing: After a transaction is agreed upon, it needs to be implemented.
This typically involves the following actions:
 Determining the positions of the di¤erent counterparties (how many securities or con-
tracts have been bought and sold and by whom, how much money should they receive
or pay). This is the narrow sense of the word clearing.
 Transferring securities or assets (to custodians, which are nancial warehouses) and
settling payments. This activity is referred to as settlement.
 Reporting to regulators, calling margins and deposits, netting.
 Handling counterparty failures.
Understood in a broad sense, clearing refers to this whole process. The market-wide
system used for clearing operations is often referred to as the market infrastructure.
The basic mechanism of clearing and counterparty risk: Clearing in spot mar-
kets di¤ers somewhat from its counterpart in derivative markets. First consider the case in
which A and B agree on a spot trade: B buys an asset (stock, bond, commodity) from A,
against the payment of price P . The clearing entity receives the asset from A and transfers
it to B (or his custodian or storage facility). The clearing entity also receives the payment
of P dollars from B and transfers it to the account of A.5
Derivative markets are more complicated because contracts are typically written over a
longer maturity and are often contingent on certain events. Consider for example the case
of a CDS. A sells protection to B against the default of a given bond. Before the maturity
of the contract, as long as the underlying bond does not default, B must pay an insurance
premium to A. Just like the payment of the price for the purchase of an asset, this payment
5In practice, this process might involve additional intermediaries, such as the brokers of A and B. For
simplicity, these are not discussed here.
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can take place via the clearing agent. If the underlying bond defaults before the maturity of
the contract, A must pay the face value of the bond to B, while B must transfer the bond
to A. Thus, the clearing entity receives the bond from B and transfers it to A, and receives
the cash payment of the face value from A and transfers this to the account of B.
Clearing entities also typically provide insurance against the default of trading counter-
parties. For example, in the CDS trade described above, if the underlying bond defaults and
A is bankrupt, then the clearing entity can provide the insurance instead of A: In this case,
it is the clearing entity that receives the bond and pays cash to B. Such insurance is more
signicant in derivative markets than in spot markets: other things equal, the risk of default
of one of the counterparties is greater over the long maturity of derivative contracts than
during the few days or hours it takes to clear and settle a spot trade. To meet the default
costs, the clearing entity must have capital and reserves.
Bilateral versus centralized clearing: The clearing process can be bilateral and
operated in a decentralized manner. In this case the trade between A and B is cleared
by a clearing brokeror prime broker.If on the same day there is a trade between two
other institutions, C & D, it can be cleared by a di¤erent broker. In contrast, with Central
Counterparty Clearing (hereafter CCC) the clearing process for several trades (between A
& B as well as between C & D) is realized within a single entity, referred to as the Central
Clearing Platform (hereafter CCP). In this centralized clearing system, the CCP takes on
the counterparty risk of all the trades. This implies that the CCP can be exposed to a large
amount of counterparty default risk. To cope with such risk, the CCP needs relatively large
capital and reserves. Such reserves can be built up by levying a fee on the brokers using
its services (possibly contingent on activity levels). The CCP can also issue equity capital
subscribed to by the brokers and nancial institutions using its services. To the extent that
the counterparty loss on a given trade is paid for by the capital and reserves of the CCP
provided by all the members of the CCP, centralizing clearing leads to the mutualization of
counterparty default risk.
CCC has been the prevailing model for futures and stock exchanges. A polar case is
the Deutsche Börse, where the trading platform and the clearing platform are vertically
integrated. In contrast, decentralized clearing is most frequent when trades are conducted
in OTC markets.6 Up to now, a large fraction of the Credit Default Swaps market has
6For a recent paper analyzing whether centralized clearing of OTC transactions can improve welfare and
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been OTC and cleared in a decentralized way. Note, however, that trading mechanisms
and clearing mechanisms are distinct. Thus, it is possible to have OTC trading and CCC.
In that case, the search for counterparties and the determination of the terms of trade is
decentralized, while the two parties who struck a deal clear the trade in a CCP.7
3 Literature
Similarly to the present paper, Stephens and Thompson (2011) study the case in which
protection sellers can default.8 They assume protection sellers are privately informed about
their type.9 They analyze the risk of contracting with a bad protection seller. When they
extend their analysis to centralized clearing, they show that it can lead to an ine¢ cient
increase in that risk. Pirrong (2011) also warns that centralized clearing could lead to an
increase in counterparty default and notes that with asymmetric information, it is not
necessarily the case that the formation of a CCP is e¢ cient.Similarly, Koeppl (2012), who,
like us, emphasizes the mutualization benets of CCPs, shows that they can upset market
discipline.
While we also nd that centralized clearing can increase counterparty default, we show,
in contrast to Stephens and Thompson (2011), Pirrong (2009), and Koeppl (2012), that
the optimal CCP is welfare improving relative to bilateral clearing.10 This di¤erence in
conclusions stems from a di¤erence in approaches. Instead of considering features of the
CCP that are exogenously given, we take an optimal contracting approach to study the
design of the optimal clearing mechanism. By construction the resulting CCP is Pareto
optimal (subject to information, resource and technology constraints.) From a normative
viewpoint, our contribution is thus to identify the conditions and the design under which
centralized clearing brings about e¢ ciency gains.
Acharya and Bisin (2010) and Leitner (2012) also o¤er insights into the optimal design of
centralized clearing. As noted by Acharya and Bisin (2010), no protection buyer can control
economize on settlement costs, see Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides (2011).
7This can be the case, e.g., for swap deals struck on the OTC market, and then cleared through
LCH.Clearnet or SwapClear. In that case, the original swap is transformed into two deals: between the
swap buyer and the CCP, and between the CCP and the swap seller.
8Thompson (2010) and Biais, Heider, Hoerova (2010) also study ine¢ ciencies associated with the default
of protection sellers, but they do not model CCPs.
9Thus, they consider an adverseselection model, which contrasts with our moralhazard setup.
10In our analysis, the CCP leads to an increase in counterparty risk relative to the decentralized clearing
case, because better risk-sharing undermines incentives to search for creditworthy counterparties.
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the trades of his counterparty with other investors in OTC markets. So when a protection
seller contracts with an additional protection buyer, this exerts a negative externality on
other protection buyers. It increases counterparty risk and generates ine¢ ciencies in equilib-
rium (similar to the ine¢ ciencies arising in the nonexclusive contracting model of Parlour
and Rajan, 2001). Acharya and Bisin (2010) show how centralized clearing can eliminate
such ine¢ ciencies by implementing price schedules that penalize the creation of counterparty
risk. Furthermore, Leitner (2012) shows how, within a central mechanism, position limits
prevent agents from entering into excessive contracts. Our focus is di¤erent. In Acharya
and Bisin (2010) and Leitner (2012), the benet of centralized clearing is that it enables
to control the risk exposure of protection sellers. In our analysis, the benet of centralized
clearing is the mutualization of counterparty default risk. Also, while centralized clearing
makes excessive risk positions observable in Acharya and Bisin (2010) or elicitable in Leitner
(2012), the benet of centralized clearing in our analysis applies even when the e¤ort to
search for creditworthy counterparties is observable.
Our analysis is related to Koeppl and Monnet (2010), who also consider the mutualization
benet of CCPs. But the market frictions they analyze di¤er from ours. They consider a
bargaining process that gives rise to ine¢ ciencies and a setting where institutions privately
conduct trades, which they must be incentivized to reveal. Our focus is on optimal contracts,
attaining information constrained Pareto optimality, and on trades that are observable and
contractible. Unlike Koeppl and Monnet (2010), we assume that protection buyers must
exert e¤ort to screen and monitor counterparties (and we also consider the case in which
this e¤ort is unobservable). Our conclusion that, to preserve incentives, protection buyers
should not be fully insured against counterparty risk is the opposite of what Koeppl and
Monnet (2010) conclude. Another related paper is Carapella and Mills (2012). Focusing on
information acquisition incentives, they show that by providing counterparty risk insurance
(and multi-lateral netting), CCPs reduce counterpartiesincentives to acquire information
about centrally cleared securities, making such securities less information sensitive and more
liquid. They consider asymmetric information about the value of the underlying asset, while
we study asymmetric information about the e¤ort of the protection buyer to nd creditworthy
counterparties.
Our analysis of the mutualization benets of CCPs also echoes the analysis of the netting
benets of CCPs by Du¢ e and Zhu (2011). Taking deposit constraints in di¤erent systems
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as given, they study which system is more economical in terms of collateral requirements.
This is motivated by their observation that collateral deposits are costly. The objective of
their analysis is the netting e¢ ciency of the system. In contrast, while we also take into
account the cost of deposits, we endogenize the deposits requested, and the objective in our
analysis is the risksharing e¢ ciency of the system. While the risk aversion of the agents
and their incentive compatibility constraints play an important role in our analysis, they are
absent from Du¢ e and Zhu (2011).11
Finally, our analysis is also related to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Hellwig (1994).
In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a continuum of households can experience early or late
consumption needs. Because consumption needs are i.i.d. across households, uncertainty
about these idiosyncratic shocks washes out in the aggregate by the law of large numbers.
Competitive banks implement the Paretooptimal mechanism when consumption needs are
observable, as they can fully mutualize the idiosyncratic liquidity risk of households. Hellwig
(1994) studies aggregate interest rate risk in a Diamond and Dybvig-like set-up. E¢ cient
risksharing requires that households bear some of this aggregate risk, even when consump-
tion needs are publicly observable. When such needs are privately observed, incentive com-
patibility constraints give an additional reason for households to be exposed to aggregate
risk. Our analysis also considers risk-sharing in an environment with both idiosyncratic and
aggregate shocks, and under incentive compatibility constraints, but there are substantial
di¤erences in the objects of analysis in Hellwig (1994) and in our paper: banks versus CCP,
value of assets versus consumption needs, liquidity risk versus counterparty risk, adverse
selection versus moral hazard.
4 The model
There are ve dates, t = 0; 1
4
; 1
2
; 3
4
and 1. A unit mass continuum of risk-averse protection
buyers faces a large population of risk-neutral protection sellers.12 The discount rate of all
market participants is normalized to one and the risk-free rate to 0.
At time t = 0, each protection seller i is endowed with one unit of assets-in-place, which
11We consider only one market, whereas Du¢ e and Zhu (2009) analyze netting e¢ ciency in a multimarket
setting. They point out that when traders intervene in di¤erent markets, having separate CCPs in di¤erent
markets can lead to excessive collateral deposits.
12Concavity of the objective function of the protection buyer can reect institutional, nancial or regulatory
constraints, such as leverage constraints or risk-weighted capital requirements.
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returns ~Ri at t = 1. The protection sellers are heterogeneous. Some of them are solid,
creditworthy institutions, which we hereafter refer to as good. They generate ~Ri = R > 1
with probability p and 0 otherwise. Others are more fragile, less creditworthy institutions,
hereafter referred to as bad. They generate ~Ri = R with probability p    only.13 When
protection seller i is good (resp. bad), we denote this by i = 1 (resp. i = 0), and
correspondingly the probability of default of protection seller i is denoted by 1  p(i). The
protection sellerspositions are completely illiquid, i.e., their liquidation value before time
1 is zero. All protection sellers are risk-neutral, have no initial endowment apart from the
illiquid asset generating R or 0, and have limited liability.
At time t = 0, each protection buyer j is endowed with an asset whose random nal
value ~j realizes at time t = 1. We assume that ~j can take on two values:  with probability
1
2
and  otherwise. The asset owned by the protection buyer can be thought of as a loan
portfolio, and  can be interpreted as occurring when the loans are only partially repaid. We
assume that R >   = , which implies that when protection sellers do not default, they
can fully insure protection buyers against their risk ~. We also assume that all exogenous
random variables are independent.
Because the protection buyers are riskaverse while the protection sellers are riskneutral,
there are potential gains from trade. But to reap these gains from trade, protection buyers
must contact protection sellers. At time t = 1
4
, protection buyer j can choose to exert
e¤ort (ej = 1) and devote resources to nding a good counterparty. This involves searching
for counterparties, screening them, and checking their risk exposure and nancial solidity.14
Denote the corresponding cost by B. Matches occur at time t = 1
2
. When exerting e¤ort, a
protection buyer nds a good protection seller with probability one. Alternatively, protection
buyer j may choose not to exert costly e¤ort (ej = 0). In this case, he nds a bad protection
seller with probability one.15 The preferences of the protection buyers are quasilinear, that
13Stephens and Thompson (2011) also analyze a model with good and bad protection sellers. But
they dene good and bad types di¤erently. In Stephens and Thompson (2011), good protection sellers invest
the insurance premium in liquid but low return assets, which can be pledged to pay the insurance, while
bad protection sellers invest the premium in illiquid high return assets, which cannot be pledged to pay the
insurance. In contrast, in the present paper, bad protection sellers have both a higher probability of default
and a lower rate of return than good protection sellers. Furthermore, in Stephens and Thompson (2011) the
presence of the two types of protection sellers is associated with an adverse selection problem, while in the
present paper it corresponds to a moral hazard problem.
14This can be interpreted in terms of due diligence.
15A richer model of the search process would have probabilities strictly between 0 and 1 to nd good
counterparties. The probabilities would reect the number of available good protection sellers. While our
01 specication is more stylized, and hence more tractable, both specications yield the same qualitative
13
is, there exists a concave utility function u such that the utility of protection buyer j with
consumption x is u(x)  ejB.
Exante, the types of protection sellers are unobservable. At time t = 1
2
, however,
protection buyer j observes the type of protection seller i with whom he is matched.
At time 3
4
, aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty is resolved. But for simplicity and
clarity, we assume until Section 6 that there is no aggregate risk and hence we postpone the
exposition of how we model this risk until then. We relax this assumption in Section 6 and
study how the introduction of aggregate risk alters the economics of clearing and risk-sharing
in our framework.
Our model starts at time t = 0, when a market infrastructure is put in place. We
consider three possibilities: bilateral trade between a protection buyer and a protection seller
(no clearing), trilateral trade with a clearing agent (decentralized clearing), or multilateral
contracting with a CCP (centralized clearing). Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events.
For simplicity, but without a¤ecting the results qualitatively, we assume that the pro-
tection buyer has all the bargaining power. Thus, contracts are designed to maximize the
protection buyers expected utility, subject to the participation, feasibility and incentive
constraints spelled out below.
At time 1, the realizations of ~Ri, ~j and ~ are observable and contractible. Until Section
7, we assume for simplicity and clarity that the e¤ort ej of protection buyers is observable
and contractible. Thus, the optimal clearing arrangement we characterize until Section 7
implements the rstbest, subject to the limited liability and search constraints. In Sec-
tion 7, we introduce moral hazard and analyze the information-constrained optimal clearing
arrangement that implements the second-best.
5 Idiosyncratic risk and observable e¤ort
In this section, we study optimal risk-sharing contracts when protection buyerse¤orts are
observable and they are only exposed to idiosyncratic risk. We rst characterize the optimal
bilateral contract between a protection buyer and a protection seller without a clearing agent.
We then consider trilateral contracting between the two parties and a single clearing agent.
We conclude the section with the analysis of the optimal multilateral contract with a CCP.
insights.
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5.1 Bilateral contracting without clearing agent
The contract, o¤ered at time t = 1
2
once a match has been made, spells out the transfer 
from the protection seller to the protection buyer.16 When  is positive, the protection seller
pays the protection buyer. When  is negative, the protection buyer pays the protection
seller. The transfer  is contingent on the value of the assets of the protection buyer (~j)
and the protection seller ( ~Ri). Figure 2 depicts the bilateral relations, and transfers  ,
in the market without clearing. Only two (representative) pairs of protectionbuyers and
protectionsellers are depicted, but the same structure applies to all matches. The protection
seller has limited liability, hence  is such that
Ri  (j; Ri); 8(j; Ri): (1)
First, consider the case in which the protection buyer chooses to exert the search e¤ort
(ej = 1) and hence he is matched with a good protection seller (i = 1). The transfer 
maximizes his expected utility subject to the limited liability and the participation constraint
of the protection seller. Thus
max

E[u(~ + (~; ~Ri))ji = 1] B; (2)
subject to (1) and the participation constraint:
0  E[(~; ~Ri)ji = 1]: (3)
The solution to this optimization problem is given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In the bilateral contract with e¤ort,
 + (; R) =  + (; 0) =  + (; R), (; R) =

1 + p
and (; 0) = 0:
Proposition 1 states that there is full risk-sharing in the optimal bilateral contract with
e¤ort as long as the protection seller does not default. The protection buyer is exposed to
counterparty risk in state (; 0), which occurs with probability 1
2
(1  p).
16An important setting for which our analysis is relevant is the CDS market. In our optimal contracting
approach, however, instead of specifying payo¤s matching the features of a given type of contract, we allow
for general transfers. For complex distributions such generality could prove untractable. For the simple
distributions we assume it does not.
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Second, consider the case in which the protection buyer does not exert e¤ort. The optimal
contract solves
max

E[u

~ + (~; ~Ri)

ji = 0]; (4)
subject to (1) and
0  E[(~; ~Ri)ji = 0]: (5)
Proposition 2 presents the solution to this optimization problem.
Proposition 2 In the bilateral contract without e¤ort,
 + (;R) =  + (; 0) =  + (; R), (; R) =

1 + p   and (; 0) = 0:
As in Proposition 1, there is full risk-sharing as long as the protection seller does not
default. But in Proposition 2 the protection buyer receives a higher transfer in state  when
the protection seller does not default, and he pays less to the protection seller in state .
The protection seller is willing to accept these terms (apparently more attractive to the
protection buyer), because the probability that he will actually pay the protection buyer is
lower (while the probability that he will be paid remains the same). Indeed, without e¤ort,
the probability of counterparty default is higher, and equal to 1
2
(1  p+ ). Combining
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 we obtain the condition under which, without clearing,
search e¤ort is optimal.
Proposition 3 Without clearing, the protection buyer prefers to exert the search e¤ort if
and only if u is concave enough and B is low enough.
5.2 Decentralized clearing
Now we turn to the case in which, in addition to the protection buyer and the protection
seller, there is a clearing agent. The contract designed at time t = 1
2
now involves, in addition
to  , the transfer C from the clearing agent to the protection buyer. When C is positive
the clearing agent pays the protection buyer, while when C is negative the protection buyer
pays the clearing agent. Figure 3 depicts the trilateral relations, and transfers  and C in
the market with decentralized clearing. Again, only two (representative) pairs of protection
buyers and protectionsellers are depicted, but the same structure applies to all matches.
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The clearing agent is risk-neutral, has limited liability and is endowed with c units of an
asset with a per-unit return at time t = 1 of  > 1. The asset is illiquid, however, and cannot
be used to make insurance payments at time t = 1. To be able to pay the protection seller
at t = 1, the clearing agent must liquidate a fraction  of his asset at time t = 0 and invest
it in a liquid asset. The opportunity cost of doing so is that the return on the liquid asset is
lower than that on the illiquid asset.17 For simplicity we assume the liquid asset only earns
the riskfree return, and we normalize the riskfree rate of return to 0.
Since the protection seller faces no such opportunity cost, he will continue to insure the
protection buyer against the ~ risk, as long as he is not in default and the clearing agent will
draw from his safe deposit to pay the protection buyer only when j =  and Ri = 0. The
limited liability condition of the clearing agent implies that
c  C(; 0); (6)
while his participation constraint is
c  c+ (1  ) c  E(C ji): (7)
In the two propositions below, we characterize the optimal contract with e¤ort. It solves
max
;;C
E[u( +  + C)j = 1] B (8)
subject to the limited liability and participation constraints of the protection seller, (1) and
(3), and the clearing agent (6) and (7), respectively.
Proposition 4 When there is no moral hazard and no aggregate risk, in the contract with
e¤ort, the clearing agent invests c = C(; 0) in the safe asset. As long as the protection
seller does not default, there is full risk-sharing, i.e.,
 + (;R) + C(;R) =  + (; 0) + C(; 0) =  + (; R) + C(; R);
but the protection buyer is not fully insured against counterparty risk, i.e.,
 + C(; 0) <  + (; R) + C(; R):
17This aspect of our model is in line with Thompson (2010). In contrast with Thompsons assumption
that the portfolio choice of the protection seller is private information, we assume the liquid holdings of
the clearing agent are observable. Thus, in our analysis, in contrast with Thompson (2010), there is no
moralhazard problem associated with safe liquid holdings.
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Insurance against counterparty risk is only partial since its provision entails the opportu-
nity cost   1. To minimize this cost, the fraction of funds invested in the safe asset is just
equal to the amount to be paid to the protection buyer in case the protection seller defaults.
As in the case without clearing, there is full risk-sharing as long as the protection seller does
not default, and hence:
(; R) =

1 + p
: (9)
The binding participation constraint of the clearing agent can be written as:18
(  1)C(; 0) =  [1 + p
2
C(; R) +
1  p
2
C(; 0)]; (10)
i.e., the expected net transfer from the protection buyer to the clearing agent (i.e., the
righthandside of (10)) covers the latters opportunity cost of liquidating a fraction of his
initial assets to hold liquid assets to pay insurance against counterparty default (i.e., the
lefthandside of (10)).
A measure of the insurance against counterparty risk is the ratio of the marginal utilities
of the protection buyer in state  when the protection seller defaults and when he does not
default:
u0( + C(; 0))
u0 ( + (; R) + C(; R))
> 1: (11)
The ratio is greater than one since there is only partial insurance against counterparty risk
(Proposition 4). The greater the insurance provided by the clearing agent, the lower this
ratio, and with full insurance the ratio goes down to 1. Substituting the transfers (; R) and
C(; R) from (9) and (10), the ratio in (11) rewrites as a function ' of the transfer C(; 0)
paid by the clearing agent in state  when the protection seller defaults (and of exogenous
parameters):
'
 
C(; 0)
  u0( + C(; 0))
u0

 + 
1+p
  1 p+2( 1)
1+p
C(; 0)
 :
Higher insurance against counterparty default (larger C(; 0)) reduces ', lowering the ratio
of marginal utilities closer to one. The following proposition characterizes the optimal degree
of counterparty risk insurance in the contract with e¤ort.
18For details, see the proof of Proposition 4.
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Proposition 5 When there is no moral hazard and no aggregate risk, in the contract with
e¤ort, if ' (0)  1 + 2( 1)
1 p , then the clearing agent is not used and 
 = 0. Otherwise, if
' (c) > 1 +
2 (  1)
1  p ; (12)
then  = 1, while if (12) does not hold, then  2 (0; 1) and C(; 0) is given by
'
 
C(; 0)

= 1 +
2 (  1)
1  p : (13)
The optimal degree of insurance against counterparty risk balances its benets (left-hand
side of (13)) with the opportunity cost of holding cash reserves (right-hand side of (13)).
When the opportunity cost of cash reserves (  1) is very high, there is little insurance. As
the probability of counterparty default (1  p) rises, insurance increases.
The optimal contract without e¤ort solves
max
;;C
E[u( +  + C)j = 0] (14)
subject to the limited liability and participation constraints of the protection seller and the
clearing agent. As in the e¤ort case, i) there is full risk-sharing as long as the protection seller
does not default, and ii) the contract provides only partial insurance against the default of
the protection seller.19 Again, one can dene a measure of the amount of insurance against
counterparty risk as the ratio of the marginal utilities across the states (; 0) and (; R):

 
C(; 0)
  u0( + C(; 0))
u0

 + 
1+p    1 p++2( 1)1+p  C(; 0)
 :
We then have the following counterpart of Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 When there is no moral hazard and no aggregate risk, in the contract without
e¤ort, if  (0)  1 + 2( 1)
1 p+ , then the clearing agent is not used and 
 = 0. Otherwise, if
 (c) > 1 +
2 (  1)
1  p+  ; (15)
then  = 1, while if (15) does not hold, then  2 (0; 1) and C(; 0) is given by

 
C(; 0)

= 1 +
2 (  1)
1  p+  : (16)
19For the sake of brevity, we do not state these results formally. Their derivation is exactly as in Proposition
4. One only replaces p with (p  ), so (;R), for example, is now given by (;R) = 1+(p ) .
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In the contract without e¤ort, the clearing agent provides more insurance to the protec-
tion buyer compared to the contract with e¤ort. This is in line with the observation that the
amount put in the safe asset is increasing in the probability of counterparty default. But,
since insurance is costly, it remains partial. And since the amount paid to the protection
buyer in case of counterparty default is higher when there is no e¤ort, so is the amount paid
to the clearing agent in state  to compensate him for insuring against counterparty risk.
The protection buyer prefers to exert search e¤ort if and only if
1 + p
2
u
 
 + (; Rjj = 1) + C(; Rjj = 1)

+
1  p
2
u( + C(; 0jj = 1)) B 
1 + p  
2
u
 
 + (; Rjj = 0) + C(; Rjj = 0)

+
1  p+ 
2
u( + C(; 0jj = 0));
which holds if the cost of e¤ort (B) is low and the increase in default risk due to lack of
e¤ort () is high.
5.3 Multilateral contracting with a CCP
Now consider the case in which there is a CCP interposing between all the pairs of protection
buyers and sellers. We maintain our assumption that e¤ort is observable, so the CCP can
request it without facing incentive constraints.20
At time t = 0, a benevolent central planner designing the contracts (including the features
of the CCP) maximizes the exante expected utility of a representative protection buyer,
subject to limited liability, participation and budget constraints. To compare with the
case of decentralized clearing of the previous section, we assume that the CCP is endowed
with c units of an asset with a per-unit return at time t = 1 of  > 1. As in the case
of decentralized clearing, it is without loss of generality or e¢ ciency to focus on contracts
where the CCP pays C(; 0)  0 to the protection buyer when state (; 0) occurs and
where it pays C(; R) = C(; 0) = C(; R)  0 in the other states. That is, the CCP
receives a participation fee paid by its members for the CCPs insurance against the default
of protection sellers. Figure 4 depicts the multilateral relations, and transfers  and C in
the market with centralized clearing. Only 6 (representative) pairs of protectionbuyers and
protectionsellers are depicted, but the same structure applies to all matches.
20Since the link between the search e¤ort of the protection buyer and the type of the protection seller
he is matched with is one to one, it makes no di¤erence whether the contract is contingent on e¤ort or on
protection seller type.
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The aggregate net transfer from the CCP at time t = 1 isZ 1
i=0
f1(i = )1(Ri = 0)C(; 0) + [1  1(i = )1(Ri = 0)]C(;R)gdi; (17)
where 1 denotes the indicator variable and i indexes the protection buyer-protection seller
pairs. Because the ~i and ~Ri are independent, the aggregate mass of defaults is deterministic
by the law of large numbers and (17) is equal to
1  p()
2
C(; 0) +
1 + p()
2
C(; R):
The participation constraint of the CCP is
c (  1)   1  p()
2
C(; 0)  1 + p()
2
C(; R): (18)
Note that increasing  tightens the participation constraint. Holding liquid assets carries an
opportunity cost for which the CCP must be compensated. As in the single clearing agent
case, the participation constraint is binding and the following result is immediate.
Proposition 7 When there is no moral hazard and no aggregate risk, the optimal CCP does
not liquidate any of its assets ( = 0) and provides full insurance against counterparty risk.
The intuition of Proposition 7 is the following. When there is no aggregate risk, by
mutualizing all the contracts, the CCP can collect an aggregate amount of fees that exactly
covers the aggregate amount of insurance payments. Thanks to mutualization, the CCP,
unlike individual clearing agents, does not need to hold liquid assets and therefore avoids the
corresponding opportunity cost. Since there is no opportunity cost of providing insurance
against counterparty risk, the CCP can fully insure protection buyers, regardless of whether
they exert search e¤ort or not. This leads to the next proposition.
Proposition 8 When there is no moral hazard and no aggregate risk, it is optimal for
protection buyers not to exert search e¤ort.
When all risk is idiosyncratic, the CCP can mutualize all risk and fully insure against
counterparty risk. Consequently, when there is no aggregate risk, protection buyers are
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fully insured. Creditworthy protection sellers are no longer needed and protection buyers
no longer need to search for them.21 In this context, while the CCP achieves the rst-best
when there is no aggregate risk, it increases the occurrence of counterparty default. Yet, this
increase in (aggregate) default is not a symptom of a market failure.
With only idiosyncratic risk and mutualization by the CCP, protection sellers actually no
longer need to be part of the risk-sharing transaction. Risk-mutualization among protection
buyers is enough. This is not the case when there is aggregate risk, a situation to which
we turn next. In that case, mutualization is not enough to deliver full insurance, protection
sellers play an important role and protection buyerse¤ort can be optimal, as it increases
the total amount of resources available to insure against aggregate risk.
6 Aggregate risk and observable e¤ort
6.1 Aggregate risk
We now study the optimal contract with a CCP when there is aggregate risk, while maintain-
ing in this section the assumption that there is no moral hazard. To extend our analysis to
aggregate risk, we extend our set-up as follows. There are two macro-states in the economy,
high and low, each occurring with equal probability. In the high state, the probability of
the protection buyers high asset value  increases to 1
2
+ , while the probability of the low
asset value  decreases to 1
2
 . In the low state, the opposite happens. The probability of 
becomes 1
2
 , while the probability of  becomes 1
2
+. Conditional on the macro-state, the
realizations of the ~j are i.i.d. Note that ex-ante, the two values  and  are equiprobable,
as in previous sections. But ex-post, after observing the macro-state at time t = 3
4
, one of
them becomes more likely. When  = 0 there is no aggregate risk and protection buyers are
exposed only to idiosyncratic risk. At the other extreme, when  = 1
2
, there is only aggregate
risk. The values of all the protection buyersassets are perfectly correlated.
21This underscores that, in spite of formal similarities, the setup we consider is very di¤erent from that
analyzed by Holmström and Tirole (1998). In Holmström and Tirole (1998), at cost B, the agent can reduce
the probability of low output. Thus, e¤ort increases the average output in the economy. Even with risk-
neutrality this can be valuable, if B is low enough. In the present model, at cost B, the agent can nd
a protection seller with low probability of default. But, e¤ort does not increase the average output in the
economy: the overall output of the protection sellers is exogenous and una¤ected by the protection buyers
e¤orts. Therefore, the e¤ort of the protection buyers can be useful only if it increases their risk-sharing
ability. However, with mutualization and no aggregate risk, full risk-sharing can be achieved even if the
protection sellers are bad. Hence, e¤ort is not optimal.
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We now consider the intermediate case  2 (0; 1
2
), i.e., there is combination of aggregate
and idiosyncratic risk. We also assume that
pR >

2
> (p  )R; (19)
that is, when all protection buyers exert e¤ort, the aggregate amount of resources of good
protection sellers (pR) is su¢ cient to fully insure protection buyers (whose exposure is 
2
),
while this may not be feasible when protection buyers do not exert the search e¤ort and only
bad protection sellers are used (whose aggregate resources are (p  )R). To focus on the
e¤ect of aggregate risk in the simplest possible set-up, we also assume that the CCP is not
endowed initially with any asset, i.e., c = 0.
The macro-state occurs at time 3
4
, after the market infrastructure is in place, contracts
have been designed and search e¤ort has been exerted. The realization of the macro-state is
publicly observable and contractible. Thus, the transfers are now contingent on the macro-
state, (;R; ). To reduce the burden of notation we denote by
 
 ; C

the transfers of the
protection seller and of the CCP in the high macrostate and by
 
 ; C

the transfers in the
low macrostate. As before, contracts are designed at time t = 0 to maximize the expected
utility of a representative protection buyer.
6.2 Optimal clearing and contracting with e¤ort
Consider rst the case in which protection buyers exert search e¤ort. The optimal contract
sets ( ; C ;  ; C) to maximize
1
2
E[u(+ +C)ji = 1; high macrostate]+
1
2
E[u(+  + C)ji = 1; low macrostate] B;
(20)
subject to the participation constraint of protection sellers
0  1
2
E[ ji = 1; high macrostate] +
1
2
E[ ji = 1; low macrostate]; (21)
and their limited liability constraints and the budget constraint of the CCP. The solution is
given in the following proposition:
Proposition 9 With aggregate risk but no moral hazard, the optimal contract with central-
ized clearing and search e¤ort provides full insurance to protection buyers, whose expected
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utility is
u

E
h
~
i
 B: (22)
When protection sellers do not default, the transfers to protection buyers are
(; R) =
1
1+p
2
  (1  p)

2
> (; R) =
1
1+p
2
+ (1  p)

2
; (23)
while in case of counterparty default, the transfer from the CCP to protection buyers is
C(; 0) = C(; 0) =

2
: (24)
Note that the transfers from protection sellers to protection buyers are feasible. The
transfer (; R) reaches its maximum when  = 1
2
(only aggregate risk) and the feasibility
constraint
R  (; R) (25)
holds by condition (19).
Since the aggregate resources of protection sellers are su¢ cient to provide full insurance,
the expected utility of a protection buyer exerting search e¤ort is the same with or without
aggregate risk. Competitive and risk-neutral protection sellers are willing to provide insur-
ance as long as they break even on average. Hence, insurance comes at no cost to protection
buyers, except for the search cost B. As in the case without aggregate risk, the CCP can
provide optimal risk-sharing. But unlike the case without aggregate risk, protection buyers
must now search for creditworthy protection sellers. Their resources are needed to insure
against aggregate risk.
6.3 Optimal clearing and contracting without e¤ort
We now consider the contract without e¤ort. The optimal contract sets ( ; C ;  ; C) to
maximize
1
2
E[u(++C)ji = 0; high macrostate]+
1
2
E[u(++C)ji = 0; low macrostate]; (26)
subject to the participation constraint of the protection seller
0  1
2
E[(~; ~Ri)ji = 0; high macrostate] +
1
2
E[(~; ~Ri)ji = 0; low macrostate];
and their limited liability constraints and the budget constraint of the CCP. The solution is
given by the following proposition.
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Proposition 10 Consider the case with aggregate risk but no moral hazard. If
R  1
1+p 
2
   (1  p+ )

2
(27)
then the optimal contract with centralized clearing and no search e¤ort provides full insurance
to protection buyers, whose expected utility is
u

E
h
~
i
: (28)
When protection sellers do not default, the transfers to protection buyers are
(; R) =
1
1+p 
2
  (1  p+ )

2
> (; R) =
1
1+p 
2
+ (1  p+ )

2
; (29)
while in case of counterparty default, the transfer from the CCP to protection buyers is
C(; 0) = C(; 0) =

2
: (30)
If (27) does not hold, then protection buyers are fully insured in the high macro-state but not
in the low one so that
C(; 0) > C(; 0): (31)
The contract without search e¤ort mirrors the contract with search e¤ort (Proposition
9) except that the probability of seller default is higher (1   p +  instead of 1   p). The
main di¤erence is, however, that the aggregate resources of protection sellers may not be
enough to fully insure protection buyers. Condition (27) stems from substituting the transfer
(; R) from (29) into the feasibility constraint (25). The right-hand-side of (27) increase in
the amount of aggregate risk : Higher aggregate risk requires a larger total transfer from
protection sellers to protection buyers in the low macrostate. Hence, there exists a threshold
level of aggregate risk above which full insurance is no longer feasible,
 =
1 + p     
R
2 (1  p+ ) <
1
2
: (32)
When aggregate risk is large, in the sense that  > , and protection buyers do not exert
search e¤ort, then the aggregate amount of resources in the low macro-state is insu¢ cient to
provide full risk-sharing even with a CCP, and (31) applies. Hence, when  > ; protection
buyers prefer to exert search e¤ort if they are su¢ ciently risk averse and the search cost is
low (u concave and B low enough).
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When aggregate risk is small,  < , the aggregate resources of bad protection sellers
are enough to provide full insurance. Protection buyers do not need to incur the search cost
B and obtain expected utility (28), which is greater than the expected utility in (22). In
that case, searching for creditworthy counterparties is not optimal (as in Proposition 8).22
When protection buyers decide ex-ante not to exert e¤ort, one might wonder why they
do not search for good protection sellers expost when the low macro-state occurs? This is
because, when the low macro-state occurs, it is too late to share the aggregate risk. The
e¤ort to search for creditworthy counterparties enhances the risk-sharing capacity, but this
can only be done exante, before the resolution of uncertainty.
To illustrate our analysis, consider the case in which there is only aggregate risk, i.e.,
 = 1
2
. In that case condition (27) is equivalent to (p  )R  
2
which cannot hold due
to (19). Thus, full risk-sharing is not feasible without exerting search e¤ort. The following
proposition describes protection buyersdecision to search for good protection sellers.
Proposition 11 With aggregate risk only and no moral hazard, protection buyers prefer to
exert the search e¤ort if and only if
u

E
h
~
i
 B  1
2
u
 
   (p  )R+ 1
2
u ( + (p  )R) : (33)
The lefthandside of (33) is the expected utility of fully hedged protection buyers when
they exert e¤ort. The righthandside is their expected utility without e¤ort. When the
low macrostate occurs, the value of the assets of all protection buyers is . The aggregate
amount of resources of (bad) protection sellers is (p  )R. The entire amount is transferred
to protection buyers when  occurs to partially insure them. To ensure the participation of
the protection sellers, the protection buyers pay them (p  )R when  occurs.
7 Aggregate risk and moral hazard
We now turn to the unobservable e¤ort case. As before, the contract is designed at time
t = 0 to maximize the exante expected utility of a representative protection buyer, but now,
in addition to participation, budget and limited liability constraints, the optimal contract
also has to satisfy the protection buyers incentive compatibility constraint.
22Note that, if  = 0, i.e., there is no aggregate risk, condition (27) is equivalent to R  1+p  which
holds under (19).
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Consider rst the case in which e¤ort is requested from the protection buyer. The ex-
pected utilities of the protection buyer under e¤ort and no e¤ort can be formally written as
in (20) and (26), respectively. Note, however, that under moral hazard, the transfers
 
 ; C

cannot be contingent on e¤ort, i.e., the same contract must be implemented, whether the
agent exerts e¤ort or not. Expressing the expected utilities explicitly (using Proposition
4 and its proof) and comparing them, e¤ort is incentive compatible, i.e., the benet from
nding a solid counterparty is larger than the search cost, when
1
2

1
2
  



u( + (; R) + C(; R))  u( + C(; 0)+
1
2

1
2
+ 



u( + (; R) + C(; R))  u( + C(; 0))  B: (34)
The rst term on the lefthand side is the probability that the high macrostate occurs,
times the probability of  in the high macrostate, times the increase in the probability
of counterparty default due to the lack of e¤ort. This rst term multiplies the di¤erence
between the protection buyers utility when his counterparty does not default and when it
does, in the good macrostate. The next terms on the lefthand side are similar, but for the
low macrostate. Hence, the incentive compatibility of search e¤ort hinges on the exposure
of the protection buyer to counterparty risk.23
Suppose the transfers are as in Proposition 9. That is, the protection buyer obtains full
insurance against counterparty default. In that case condition (34) does not hold. Thus,
protection buyers have no incentive to search for creditworthy counterparties. Consequently,
for such transfers, there is a high (and socially suboptimal) default rate. Hence, we state
the following lemma:
Lemma 1 When protection buyers obtain full insurance against counterparty risk, they do
not exert unobservable e¤ort to search for creditworthy counterparties. Hence, to induce
such e¤ort, centralized clearing must be accompanied with only partial insurance against
counterparty risk.
23The central planner could use a revelation game to elicit truthful messages from the protection buyer and
the protection seller about the latters type. For simplicity we rule this out. To micro-found this restriction
one could allow for collusion between the protection buyer and the protection seller (as in La¤ont and
Martimort, 2000), and assume it is costly for the protection seller to be revealed bad to the central planner
(e.g. due to higher regulation cost and compliance burden or loss of reputation). This would preclude costless
revelation. If the revelation cost is large enough, it becomes e¢ cient for the central planner to impose a
condition similar to (34), precluding full insurance against counterparty risk.
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The next proposition solves for the second-best contract with search e¤ort. The classic
trade-o¤ between incentives and insurance arises and incentive-compatibility requires that
protection buyers remain exposed to some risk.
Proposition 12 With aggregate risk and unobservable search e¤ort, the optimal contract
that induces e¤ort no longer o¤ers full insurance to protection buyers and we have
 + (; R) + C(; R) =  + (; R) + C(; R)
>  + (;R) + C(; R) =  + (;R) + C(;R)
>  + C(; 0) =  + C(; 0)
The optimal transfers are given by:
1
2


u( + (; R) + C(; R))  u( + C(; 0)) = B;
(; R) =  p(; R) + 2 (1  p)1
2
(1 + p)   (1  p)
C(; 0);
u( + C(; 0))
u( + (; R) + C(; R))
=
(1  p)u( + (; R) + C(;R))
u( + (; R) + C(; R))  pu( + (;R) + C(; R)) ;
C(; R) =
   1
2
   (1  p)
1
2
(1 + p) +  (1  p)
C(; 0) and C(;R) =
   1
2
+ 

(1  p)
1
2
(1 + p)   (1  p)
C(; 0):
In the rst-best, protection buyers obtain full insurance when they exert search e¤ort.
With moral hazard, this is no longer the case. Lemma 1 states that protection buyers must
be exposed to counterparty risk to ensure that they exert search e¤ort: There must be a
wedge between + (; R)+ C(; R) and + C(; 0). Such a wedge can be obtained either
by raising + (; R)+ C(; R) or by lowering + C(; 0). The latter is more costly since a
protection buyers utility is minimal when  is realized and the protection seller defaults. To
ensure the participation of protection sellers, the increase in (; R) must be compensated
by a decrease in (;R). Hence, protection buyers are no longer insured against their -risk,
 + (; R) + C(; R) >  + (;R) + C(;R). They are, however, fully insured against
aggregate risk. Incentive compatibility requires exposure to counterparty but not aggregate
risk, since e¤ort a¤ects the former but not the latter. Moreover, under e¤ort, the aggregate
resources of protection sellers are su¢ cient to absorb the macro-shock.
The optimal contract without e¤ort is as in Proposition 10. Protection buyers prefer the
contract with e¤ort if and only if their expected utility with e¤ort is higher than without
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e¤ort. Since their expected utility in the optimal contract with unobservable e¤ort is neces-
sarily lower than in the rst-best, while their expected utility without e¤ort is una¤ected by
the observability of e¤ort, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 13 The set of parameters for which the optimal contract requests e¤ort is
smaller when e¤ort is unobservable (moral hazard) than when it is observable.
The proposition states that moral hazard reduces the equilibrium provision of search
e¤ort. It therefore reduces the creditworthiness of protection sellers and increases the occur-
rence of counterparty default in equilibrium.
8 Discussion
8.1 Should participation in the CCP be mandatory?
In the above analysis with decentralized clearing, clearing agents must set aside funds to
provide some insurance against counterparty risk. With centralized clearing, this is not
necessary as the insurance against counterparty risk is funded by contributions from the
CCPs members. If one institution anticipates that all the others will participate in the CCP,
then it is optimal for that institution to also participate and benet from mutualization. But
if each institution anticipates that no one else will participate in the CCP, then it is optimal
for each of them to opt for decentralized clearing instead. Indeed, when no (or only few)
institution(s) participate in the CCP, there is no scope for mutualization. Thus, there are two
pure strategy Nash equilibria in the game where institutions have to decide exante whether
to opt for centralized or decentralized clearing: one equilibrium in which all institutions
opt for decentralized clearing and the other in which they all opt for centralized clearing.
If all clearing is initially decentralized, then it may be di¢ cult to change expectations and
coordinate on the (Pareto dominant) equilibrium with centralized clearing. In that case,
making centralized clearing mandatory is Pareto improving.
8.2 OTC trading of heterogeneous contracts and exchange trading
of standardized contracts
The model presented above should be thought of as a model of OTC trading of relatively
homogeneous contracts. As in OTC markets, transactions between protection buyers and
29
protection sellers are bilateral deals. Since by assumption all ~ are identically distributed,
the risk underlying all transactions is homogeneous.24 In the market we consider, both
decentralized and centralized clearing can be used, but the latter Pareto dominates the
former. How would the analysis and results change in two alternative settings: i) OTC
trading of heterogeneous contracts, and ii) exchange trading of standardized contracts?25
These two cases raise di¤erent challenges.
One way to think of OTC trading of heterogeneous contracts in our setup is to consider
the case in which the -risk is not identically distributed across protection buyers. Di¤erent
protection buyers then have di¤erent risk proles. If these were observable, then di¤erent
protection buyers should hold di¤erent contracts ( ; C) to accommodate their heterogeneity.
Such a ne-tuning of contracts can be complicated. If a protection buyers risk prole was
private information, then additional incentive compatibility conditions should be imposed,
which could severely constrain the set of feasible allocations. Because of these constraints,
the mutualization benets of centralized clearing could be di¢ cult to reap in OTC markets
for heterogeneous contracts. This conclusion is in line with Koeppl and Monnet (2010),
who show that with customized contracts, fungibility is limited, which reduces the scope for
insurance through mutualization.
On the other hand, to model trading of highly standardized contracts (as on exchanges),
consider the case in which the -risk is perfectly correlated across protection buyers. The -
risk becomes aggregate and cannot be mutualized. Yet, centralized clearing remains e¢ cient,
because the counterparty risk can be mutualized. To reap the benets of such mutualization,
the CCP should strive to attract a diverse population of protection sellers, e.g., from di¤erent
states, countries or industries.
Another important di¤erence between the trading process of our model and the one
prevailing on derivative exchanges is anonymity. In our model, as in OTC markets, the deals
are bilateral. Thus, each party observes the identity of its counterparty and can use the
knowledge of the counterpartys risk prole in the contract. In contrast, trading on exchanges
is often anonymous. Such anonymity may preclude searching, screening and monitoring of
solid counterparties. Our analysis shows that this can increase systemic risk. Markets where
counterparty risk is an important issue, in particular the markets for derivatives with their
24In contrast, counterparty risk could be heterogeneous when good and bad protection sellers coexist.
With such coexistence, the features of clearing arrangements should be adjusted to t the counterparty risk
of each protection seller.
25Exchange trading of heterogeneous products would be unrealistic.
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long contract maturities, should not be anonymous. Instead, institutions should be able
(and encouraged) to screen and monitor the creditworthiness of their counterparties in these
markets.
8.3 Governance
The analysis above spells out the optimal design of the CCP, maximizing the expected
utility of protection buyers, subject to the participation, incentive and feasibility constraints
of the di¤erent parties. In practice, who would perform and implement this design, and
thus set up a socially optimal CCP? CCPs are, in a sense, utilities, providing services to
nancial institutions. Such utilities are often structured as cooperatives, or mutuals, whose
members are both owners and users. Consider a mutual CCP, whose members would be the
protection buyers. Its objective and constraints would be those analyzed above, and it would
therefore implement the optimal CCP we characterized. By contrast, consider a for-prot,
shareholder-owned CCP. Its objective, the maximization of prot, would not necessarily
coincide with the maximization of social welfare. We have shown above that, in the presence
of moral hazard, the CCP should expose its members to some counterparty risk to maintain
their incentives. Suppose that the for-prot CCP did not do that and o¤ered full insurance.
Then, if the protection buyers believed the CCP would indeed deliver full insurance, they
would not exert search e¤ort and would be willing to pay large fees for this full insurance.
In the good macro-state, the CCP would use part of these fees to pay insurance, and the
remaining part would be prots. In the bad macro-state, the rate of counterparty failure
would be large and the CCP would go bankrupt. To the extent that a large population of
protection buyers operates within the CCP, such a bankruptcy would be a systemic event.
The government would have to step in and bail out protection buyers, thus conrming their
initial expectation that full insurance is being provided. Thus, CCPs managed as for-prot
organizations may be prone to gambling and generating systemic risk. Hence, they should
be regulated. In particular, their capital should be large enough to absorb counterparty
defaults so that government bail outs are not needed. Also, their risk exposure should be
monitored and their ability to withstand aggregate shocks be tested.
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9 Conclusion
In line with the classic theory of insurance, our analysis identies three ways in which
counterparty risk can be mitigated. First, resources can be deposited in safe assets and used
to make promised payments in case of counterparty default. This is comparable to self-
insurance, whereby an agent saves to insure against future negative shocks (see Ehrlich and
Becker, 1972). Second, traders can exert e¤ort to nd creditworthy counterparties, whose
default risk is low. This is comparable to self-protection, whereby an agent exerts e¤ort to
reduce damage probabilities (again as in Ehrlich and Becker, 1972). Third, trading parties
can mutualize their risk.
We show that an appropriately designed centralized clearing mechanism enables trading
parties to benet from the mutualization of (the idiosyncratic component of) risk. Central-
ized clearing therefore dominates no-clearing and decentralized clearing. But we also warn
that such an arrangement has limitations. First, mutualization can only deal with idiosyn-
cratic risk. It leaves trading parties exposed to aggregate risk. Dealing with aggregate risk
can require that agents search for solid, creditworthy counterparties. Second, mutualization
can weaken the incentives of the trading parties to incur the unobservable e¤ort necessary
to nd these solid counterparties. To cope with this moral hazard problem, an incentive
compatible clearing mechanism must be put in place. Such a mechanism requires that pro-
tection buyers remain exposed to some counterparty risk in order to preserve their incentives
to search for solid counterparties. We thus uncover a tradeo¤ between the ability of the sys-
tem to withstand aggregate shocks (which requires that incentives be maintained), and the
extent to which idiosyncratic risk can be mutualized in a CCP.
Two limitations of our model are that we assume the CCP i) maximizes social welfare
and ii) controls counterparty risk indirectly via the incentives of protection buyers. In further
research, it would be important to analyze how the governance, regulation and competitive
position of CCPs a¤ect their willingness and ability to put in place optimal clearing systems
and to directly monitor the creditworthiness of their members. Such monitoring would involve
running stresstests and controlling the capitalization and riskexposure of CCP members.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 The optimal contract with e¤ort solves
max

1
2
pu
 
 + (; R)

+
1
2
(1  p)u   + (; 0)+1
2
pu ( + (; R))+
1
2
(1  p)u(+(; 0)) B
subject to the participation constraint of the good protection seller
0  1
2
p(; R) +
1
2
(1  p) (; 0) + 1
2
p(; R) +
1
2
(1  p) (; 0): (35)
and the limited liability constraints in (1).
The rst-order conditions yield:
u0
 
 + (;R)

= + 1;
u0
 
 + (; 0)

= + 2;
u0 ( + (; R)) = + 3;
u0 ( + (; 0)) = + 4;
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint and 1 to 4 are the
Lagrange multipliers on the limited liability constraints, respectively.
We proceed in four steps. First, we show that  > 0 and the participation constraint
must bind. Suppose not. Then,  = 0 and the rst-order conditions imply that all the
limited liability constraints bind (all s must be strictly positive since the marginal utilities
are strictly positive). Using the now implied transfers in the participation constraint yields
0  pR; which is a contradiction since pR > 0.
Second, we show that at least one limited liability constraint has to bind. Suppose not.
Then, all s are equal to zero and the marginal utilities are equalized across all states so that
(;R) = (; 0), (; R) = (; 0) and (; 0) =  + (; 0). Since (; 0) < 0 (the limited
liability constraint is slack), we get that +(; 0) < 0 implying that (;R) = (; 0) < 0.
Since (; R) = (; 0) < 0, we get (;R) + (; R) < 0.
From the binding participation constraint we have
(;R) + (; R) =  1  p
p

(; 0) + (; 0))

> 0;
which contradicts (;R) + (; R) < 0.
Third, we show that the limited liability constraint for (; 0) must bind. Suppose not
and 0 > (; 0). Then it would be possible to increase (; 0) by " and decrease (;R) by
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". This keeps the participation constraint binding and yields a higher utility to the buyer
(due to concavity of u and  < ). But this means that 0 > (; 0) cannot be optimal.
Finally, we show that the other limited liability constraints are slack. We derive the
optimal allocation under this assumption and then show that the limited liability constraints
are indeed slack. Since the marginal utilities are equalized across the three states in which
the limited constraints do not bind, we have (;R) = (; 0) and (; R) =  + (; R).
Substituting into the binding participation constraint, we obtain (; 0) =   p
1+p
 < 0 and
hence (; R) = 
1+p
<  < R. Note that the limited liability constraints are indeed slack
in this allocation. QED
Proof of Proposition 2 For brevity this proof is omitted. It goes along the same lines
as the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3 The expected utility of the protection buyer under e¤ort is
higher than his expected utility under no e¤ort if and only if
E[u

~ + (~; ~Ri)

ji = 1] B  E[u

~ + (~; ~Ri)

ji = 0]:
Substituting for the transfers  from Propositions 1 and 2, respectively, we get
(1 + p)u

 +

1 + p

  2B  (1 + p  )u

 +

1 + p  

+ u()
or, after collecting terms and re-arranging,
u

 + 
1+p 

  u()

1+p 
 
u

 + 
1+p 

  u

 + 
1+p


1+p 

1+p
 2B

1+p 
Note that the rst term is the slope of a line between u() and u

 + 
1+p 

, while the
second term is the slope of a line between u

 + 
1+p

and u

 + 
1+p 

. QED
Proof of Proposition 4 Let  and C denote the Lagrange multipliers on the protec-
tion sellers and clearing agents participation constraints, respectively. Let 0 and 1 denote
the Lagrange multipliers on the feasibility constraints 0    1 and let 2 be the Lagrange
multiplier on the feasibility constraint c  C (; 0).
Since the only role of the clearing agent will be to insure against counterparty risk, we
can assume without loss of generality that the transfers with the clearing agent are the
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same whenever the protection seller does not default, C(;R) = C(; R) = C(; 0)  ^C .
Moreover, the structure of the contracting problem between the protection buyer and the
protection seller, and its solution, are similar to those in the proof of Proposition 1. For
ease of exposition, we therefore ignore the limited liability constraints of the protection
seller, except the one in state (; 0), which will bind, i.e.,  (; 0) = 0. The intuition is the
following. It would be suboptimal for a protection buyer to pay a bankrupt protection seller
in a state when the protection buyer actually wants to receive a payment, because ~ takes
on its low value, . Also, as before, the payment from the protection buyer to the protection
seller does not depend on the sellers asset return when the buyers asset as a high value,
(;R) = (; 0)  ^ . The protection seller is risk-neutral but the protection buyer is risk-
averse. Hence, the optimal contract gives the buyer the same consumption in states
 
; R

and (; 0).
The rst-order conditions with respect to ^ , (; R), ^C , C(; 0) and  yield
u0( + ^ + ^C) = ; (36)
u0( + (; R) + ^C) = ; (37)
u( + (; 0) + ^C) = C ; (38)
(1  p)u0( + C(; 0)) = C (1  p) + 22; (39)
C (  1) c = 0   1 + 2c; (40)
respectively. By (36) and (37), the participation constraint of the protection seller binds, i.e.,
^ = p(; R), and there is full risk-sharing as long as the protection seller does not default,
with (; R) = 
1+p
.
By (38), C > 0 and the participation constraint of the clearing agent binds. By (36) and
(38), we have that  = C . Substituting into (39), we get
u0( + C(; 0)) = +
22
1  p;
which, combined with (37), yields
 + C(; 0) <  + (; R) + ^C :
Hence, the clearing agent only provides a partial insurance against counterparty default.
Moreover,  > 0 must hold since otherwise the clearing agent cannot provide any insur-
ance against counterparty risk (as C(; 0) = 0 in this case). Hence, 0 = 0. It follows from
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(40) that 2 > 0 must hold and  =
C(;0)
c
. Since the participation constraint of the clearing
agent binds, we have that ^C =  C(; 0)1 p+2( 1)
1+p
. QED
Proof of Proposition 5 Using (39) and (40), we can write:
'
 
C
  u0( + C(; 0))
u0

 + 
1+p
  C(; 0)1 p+2( 1)
1+p
 = 1+ 2 (  1)
1  p +
21
(1  p) cu0( + 
1+p
+ C(; R))
(41)
If '
 
C(; 0)

> 1 + 2( 1)
1 p at 
C(; 0) = c (which is the maximum C(; 0) as  = 1),
then '
 
C(; 0)

> 1 + 2( 1)
1 p for all smaller 
C(; 0) and hence 1 > 0 and  = 1. Then,
C(; 0) = c. If ' (0)  1+ 2( 1)
1 p , then (41) cannot hold for any 
C(; 0) > 0 and the clearing
agent is not used. Otherwise, C(; 0) is given by '
 
C(; 0)

= 1 + 2( 1)
1 p . QED
Proof of Proposition 6 For brevity this proof is omitted. It goes along the same lines
as the proofs of Propositions 4 and 5.
Proof of Proposition 8 Consider rst the optimal contract with e¤ort. Written
explicitly, the objective function (8) is
1
2
pu
 
 + (;R) + C(; R)

+
1
2
(1  p)u   + (; 0) + C(; 0)+
1
2
pu
 
 + (; R) + C(; R)

+
1
2
(1  p)u   + (; 0) + C(; 0) :
Using (;R) = (; 0); C(;R) = C(; 0) = C(; R); (; 0) = 0 (see the proof of Propo-
sition 4), the objective function becomes
1
2
u
 
 + (; R) + C(;R)

+
1
2
pu
 
 + (; R) + C(;R)
  1
2
(1  p)u   + C(; 0) (42)
Using Proposition 7 (binding participation constraint for CCP and  = 0), we have
C(;R) =  (1  p)
(1 + p)
C(; 0): (43)
Using (43) to substitute for C(;R) in (42) and taking the rst-order condition with respect
to C(; 0) yields
 

u0

 + (;R)  (1  p)
(1 + p)
C(; 0)

+ pu0

 + (; R)  (1  p)
(1 + p)
C(; 0)

= (1 + p)u0
 
 + C(; 0)

(44)
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As in the previous subsections, there is full risk-sharing as long as the protection seller does
not default. Hence,
u0

 + (; R)  (1  p)
(1 + p)
C(; 0)

= u0

 + (; R)  (1  p)
(1 + p)
C(; 0)

:
Using (43) to substitute back for C(;R), equation (44) simplies to
 u  + (; R) + C(;R) = u  + C(; 0)
implying  C(; R) = C(; 0)+(; R). Using full risk-sharing across states and the binding
participation constraint of the protection seller, we get (; R) = 
1+p
and C(; 0) = 
2
.
The expected utility under e¤ort is thus
EU(i = 1) = u

 +

2

 B = u

E
h
~
i
 B: (45)
Following the same steps for the optimal contract without e¤ort yields (; R) = 
1+p 
and C(; 0) = 
2
. The expected utility without e¤ort is thus
EU(i = 0) = u

 +

2

= u

E
h
~
i
: (46)
Comparing expected utility of the protection buyer under e¤ort and without e¤ort, we
have
EU(i = 1) = u

E
h
~
i
 B < u

E
h
~
i
= EU(i = 0):
QED
Proof of Proposition 9 Let  denote the Lagrange multiplier on the protection sellers
participation constraint. First-order conditions with respect to (;R) (= (; 0)), (; R),
C(; 0), (;R) (= (; 0)), (; R) and C(; 0) yield
u( + (;R) + C(;R)) =  (47)
u( + (; R) + C(;R)) =  (48) 
1
2
+ 

u( + (;R) + C(;R))
1
2
(1 + p) +  (1  p) +
 
1
2
   pu( + (; R) + C(; R))
1
2
(1 + p) +  (1  p) = u( + 
C(; 0))
(49)
u( + (;R) + C(;R)) =  (50)
u( + (; R) + C(;R)) =  (51) 
1
2
+ 

u( + (;R) + C(;R))
1
2
(1 + p) +  (1  p) +
 
1
2
   pu( + (; R) + C(; R))
1
2
(1 + p) +  (1  p) = u( + 
C(; 0))
(52)
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By (47), the participation constraint of the protection seller binds. Using (47) and (48) in
(49), and simplifying yields:
u( + C(; 0)) = 
Similarly, using (50) and (51) in (52), and simplifying yields
u( + C(; 0)) =  (53)
As before, the CCP will collect the fees such that they exactly cover the insurance payments
in each state, 
1
2
  

(1  p) C(; 0) =  

1
2
+  +

1
2
  

p

C(;R)
in the high state and
1
2
+ 

(1  p) C(; 0) =  

1
2
   +

1
2
+ 

p

C(;R)
in the low state. Hence, we have that
C(;R) =  
 
1
2
   (1  p) C(; 0)
1
2
(1 + p) +  (1  p) and 
C(; R) =  
 
1
2
+ 

(1  p) C(; 0)
1
2
(1 + p)   (1  p) (54)
Using full risk-sharing across states, the binding participation constraint of the protection
seller and (54), we get
C(; 0) = C(; 0) =

2
Furthermore,
(; R) =
1
1
2
(1 + p) +  (1  p)
C(; 0), (; R) =
1
1
2
(1 + p)   (1  p)
C(; 0);
(;R) =   + (; R), (;R) =   + (; R)
and C(;R), C(; R) are given by (54).
QED
Proof of Proposition 10 For brevity, we only sketch the proof. First, suppose that the
feasibility constraint (25) does not bind. Then the proof is identical to the one of Proposition
9 once we replace p with (p  ).
When the feasibility constraint binds,
R <
1
1
2
(1 + p  )   (1  p+ )

2
;
40
then we denote the Lagrange multiplier on the feasibility constraint by  . The rst-order
condition (51) in the case without search e¤ort becomes
u( + (; R) + C(;R)) = +
  
1
2
+ 

(p  ) :
Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 9 now yields
u( + C(; 0)) = 
but
u( + C(; 0)) > ;
and hence C(; 0) > C(; 0).
QED
Proof of Proposition 11 For the special case of  = 1
2
, the rst-order conditions of
(26) (the case without e¤ort) with respect to (;R), (; R) and C(; 0) (the other three
variables drop out of the objective function and the constraints) yield
u( + (; R) + C(;R)) = +
 
p   = u( + 
C(; 0));
where  and  are the Lagrange multipliers on the participation and the feasibility constraint,
respectively. Hence, (; R) + C(;R) = C(; 0) and, using (; R) = R and C(; R) from
the CCPs resource constraints (see also 54),
C(; R) =  
1
2
(1  p+ ) C(; 0)
2 (p  ) (55)
we have
C(; 0) = (p  )R
Using the binding participation constraint of the protection seller, we have
(; R) =   (p  )R:
QED
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Proof of Proposition 12 Let  and  denote the Lagrange multipliers on the pro-
tection sellers participation constraint and on the protection buyers incentive constraint,
respectively. The rst-order conditions with respect to (;R), (; R), C(; 0), (; R),
(; R) and C(; 0) are:
u0( + (;R) + C(; R)) =  (56)
p (1 + )u0( + (; R) + C(; R)) = p (57)
(1  p)  1
2
+ 

u0( + (;R) + C(;R)) + p (1 + v)
 
1
2
  u0( + (; R) + C(;R))
1
2
(1 + p) +  (1  p) [1  p (1 + )]
= u0( + C(; 0)) (58)
u0( + (;R) + C(; R)) =  (59)
p (1 + )u0( + (; R) + C(; R)) = p (60)
(1  p)  1
2
  u0( + (;R) + C(;R)) + p (1 + )  1
2
+ 

u0( + (; R) + C(; R))

1
2
(1 + p)   (1  p) [1  p (1 + )]
= u0( + C(; 0)) (61)
By (56),  > 0 and hence the participation constraint of the protection seller binds.
Using (56) and (57) in (58), we get:
u( + C(; 0)) =
(1  p)
1  p (1 + ) (62)
Similarly, using (59) and (60) in (61), we get:
u( + C(; 0)) =
(1  p)
1  p (1 + ) (63)
It follows that C(; 0) = C(; 0). By (56) and (59), (; R)+C(; R) = (; R)+C(;R).
By (57) and (60), (; R) + C(;R) = (; R) + C(; R). Using these equalities and (54)
to substitute in the binding participation constraint, we get
 (;R) = p(; R)  2 (1  p) 
C(; 0)
1
2
(1 + p)   (1  p)
which yields (; R) as a function of (; R) and C(; 0).
Furthermore, it must be that  > 0 in the optimum so that the incentive constraint binds.
Suppose not, i.e.,  = 0. Then, marginal utilities are equalized across all states, implying
that (; R)+ C(;R) = C(; 0) and (; R)+ C(;R) = C(; 0). But then, the incentive
42
constraint cannot hold as B > 0. A contradiction. Since the incentive constraint binds, we
have, using (; R) + C(;R) = (; R) + C(; R) and C(; 0) = C(; 0),
u( + (; R) + C(;R))  u( + C(; 0)) = 2B

This equation yields (; R) as a function of C(; 0).
Next, note that by (59) and (60),
u( + (;R) + C(; R))
u( + (; R) + C(; R))
= 1 +  > 1
since  > 0. It follows that + (; R)+ C(;R) > + (;R)+ C(;R). Furthermore, by
(63), we have
u( + C(; 0)) =
(1  p)
1  p (1 + )u(
 + (; R) + C(;R))
Since 1 +  > 1, we have that  + (;R) + C(; R) >  + C(; 0). The optimal transfer
C(; 0) is given by:
u( + C(; 0)) =
(1  p)u( + (;R) + C(; R))u( + (; R) + C(;R))
u( + (; R) + C(; R))  pu( + (; R) + C(;R))
In sum, protection buyers utilities are no longer equalized, even when the protection
seller does not default, and
 + (; R) + C(;R) =  + (; R) + C(;R) >  + (;R) + C(; R)
=  + (;R) + C(; R) >  + C(; 0) =  + C(; 0)
holds in the optimum.
QED
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Figure 1: Sequence of events 
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Figure 2: No clearing 
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Figure 3: Decentralized clearing 
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Figure 4: Centralized clearing 
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